Communications in cyberspace position unique security
difficulties. Starting in 2009, the United States Military integrated a Cyber
Command on the premise that cyberspace dominance might be as essential in a
time of dispute as standard domains of air, sea, and land warfare. This firm's
charter covers just "specified Department of Defense details
networks," leaving the civilian Internet for others.
The next administration faces a number of difficulties to
assure that electronic interactions transit freely in the cyber domain.
This paper is interested in how the United States ought to
safeguard civilian Web use. We leave concerns of national security-- in the
military sense-- for the Defense Department and those who add to its (largely
classified) preparation and application.
However a look at tactical concerns shows the importance and
difficulty of the challenge, even with civilian communications. The
"domain" of sea power provides useful examples with network security.
Even on the high seas, the burden of securing ocean commerce
has not constantly rested with the Navy alone. Until piracy was suppressed in
the mid-19th century, it was common for merchant ships to equip themselves to
combat off pirate attacks. In the last few years, lots of business ships have
actually arranged for personal security firms with armed operatives to help
safeguard them from pirate attacks in especially hazardous regions. Throughout
the world wars, the US Merchant Marine, following the lead of British ships,
installed marine guns-- and later deployed depth charges-- to eliminate off
U-boat attacks.
Just like the seas, so with cyber: to the level that we can,
we must guarantee that electronic interactions transit freely in the cyber
domain. We ought to insist on the security of our own communications.
Our focus in this paper is on methods to safeguard
American-based networks. However because a lot of the world's Web traffic transits
through American networks, what we do here can add to worldwide Internet
security. It can likewise be an example to foreign partners-- and a deterrent
to foreign foes. We believe personal security firms, as well as the United
States government, can add to protecting American cyber networks.
A major part of our recommended strategy is to raise the
expense of attacks by determining assailants and in some cases countering at
them. To accomplish this, personal firms ought to be offered the latitude to explore
active countermeasures. As we explain, there are great policy needs to
encourage such experimentation. The policy and legal objections to hack-back
activities are less weighty than critics presume.
We likewise outline 2 extra components of a security
technique. Initially, we provide a set of legal modifications that will enhance
the incentives for private companies to construct protected and resilient
products. This will make American the online world more robust versus attacks
by criminals and foreign powers. Second, we propose a brand-new federal cyber security company to supervise and coordinate government security
activities and defenses of independently run important facilities.
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